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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930588-CA
JAMES J . CONTREL,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has
appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a, Section 3(2) of the
Utah Code (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right from a final judgment of conviction for the offense of
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Do alterations to a vehicle, consistent with the existence of a secret
compartment, constitute an articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed?
Does the Constitution of Utah require that consent to search be both knowing
and voluntary?
1

Was there sufficient attenuation between the unlawful stop and detention and
voluntary consent to allow the evidence seized pursuant to such consent to be
admissible?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case involves questions of law and the application of facts to legal
standards. Such issues are reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial
court's ruling. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in an information on February 4, 1992. (R.1)

The

information alleged the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended), a Second Degree
Felony. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. (R. 19-20) That motion was
denied after an evidentiary hearing. (R. 61) The court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law in relation to its ruling on that motion. (R. 62-65)

Appellant

entered a guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the ruling on the motion to
suppress. (R. 74-82)

Appellant was sentenced on September 2 1 , 1993, to the

indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 100-101)
The trial court granted appellant's certificate of probable cause and continued
appellant on bail to allow the suppression issue to be decided by this court. (R. 96)
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 4, 1992, Sergeant Paul Mangleson and trooper Lance Bushnell of
the Utah Highway Patrol were on duty on Interstate 15 in Juab county, Utah. (R. 106,
134) At about 2:00 p.m., the two were in Mangleson's vehicle, parked at mile post
217. (R.106) They were about ten to fifteen feet off the side of the highway in the
northbound lanes. At that time, Mangleson observed a late model pickup truck driving
northbound on the interstate. (R. 106, 136) The troopers followed the truck for about
two miles for the purpose of making observations. (R. 108, 136)

In doing so,

Mangleson drove his patrol vehicle behind the left side of the appellant's truck. (R.
108, 136)
Sergeant Mangleson noticed that the vehicle was a late model Chevrolet pickup
truck. (R. 108) It had a heavy plastic bedliner and tool box in the bed of the truck (R.
107, 108, 138) Mangleson also observed that the truck had a heavy metal bumper
that had been bent upward. (R. 108, 136, 141) When Mangleson pulled next to the
truck he was able to make some other observations by looking into the left rear wheel
well. (R. 106-107) Mangleson was able to observe that the truck had been freshly
undercoated. (R. 108, 138, 139) He noted that the gas tank was lower than those
on factory issued models (R. 107, 108, 137, 139) and that heavy duty shocks had
been added. (R. 137)

Finally, Mangleson was able to observe that the airspace

normally located between the frame and the bed of a pickup truck could not be seen.
(R. 107, 108, 138, 139, 142)
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Mangleson signaled the vehicle to stop at about milepost 215. (R. 108) At no
time during the incident did Mangleson observe any traffic violations. (R. 115) The
driver did not try to evade the troopers in any way. (R. 119) At one point the driver
even waived at the troopers. (R. 118)

Mangleson stopped the vehicle because

conditions he observed were very similar to the conditions he had observed during a
stop of a different truck several months earlier. (R. 108, 137) 1 He testified that the
alterations were consistent with a secret compartment located in the truck (R. 152)
Mangleson indicated he had been involved in the stops of seven other vehicles with
hidden compartments. (R. 142) Three of those were pickup trucks. (R. 108) One of
those trucks contained no contraband in the hidden compartment. (R. 153)
After stopping the vehicle, appellant was identified as the driver. (R. 109)
Appellant produced a Florida driver's license. (R. 109) The vehicle registration was
from Pennsylvania and was not in appellant's name. (R. 109) Appellant identified the
owner as a friend of his. (R. 109) Mangleson requested permission to search the
vehicle. Appellant agreed to the search. (R.110) Mangleson then had appellant sign
a written waiver. (R. 110) Mangleson admitted if appellant had not consented to the
search he would have conducted it anyway. (R. 110) Mangleson further indicated
that the vehicle would be forfeited even if contraband had not been discovered. (R.
123, 153) In searching the truck, Mangleson unbolted a plate behind the bumper and

1

Although Sergeant Mangleson described this other truck, no pictures of it were
produced. He testified that he had access to those pictures and the negatives, but
did not bring them to court. (R. 149)
4

observed a compartment. (R. 110-111) A quantity of marijuana was located in that
compartment. (R. 111)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To stop a vehicle on the highway a police officer must be able to describe
reasonable articulable suspicions to demonstrate that a crime is being committed. The
mere existence of a hidden compartment does not indicate that contraband may be
contained in that compartment. There was an insufficient basis on which to stop the
vehicle. The evidence seized as a result of such a stop must be ordered suppressed.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution should require that any consent
to search be both voluntary and knowing. Policy considerations require that suspects
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should be aware that they need not consent to a request by a law enforcement officer
to conduct a search.
Any consent that was given was not sufficiently attenuated from the initial
illegal stop and detention. The consent was given a very short time after the stop.
There were no intervening circumstances. The stop without an articulable suspicion
that a crime was being committed constituted a purposeful or flagrant violation of the
fourth amendment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MERE EXISTENCE OF A HIDDEN COMPARTMENT
FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT
APPELLANT WAS INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSION OF A
CRIME.
The stop of a motor vehicle by law enforcement officers is a detention. It is
subject to the restrictions at the fourth amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution. State v. Carpina 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986). In Caroina. the court
noted that the legal basis for such a stop is described in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1953 as amended). That statute provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
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Such a "reasonable suspicion" must be based on objective facts. State v. Swanigan,
699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). In State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), the
court acknowledged that " . . . a trained law enforcement officer may be able to
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to
the untrained observer." JJL at 88. The court noted in Trujillo that the officer is
entitled to assess his observations in light of his experience. However, in State v.
Potter, _ P . 2 d _ , 224 U.A.R. 19 (Utah App. 1993), the court described articulable
suspicion stating, "An officer must be able to articulate some unlawful or suspicious
behavior connecting the detainee to suspect criminal activity." Id at 2 1 .
The cases from the Utah appellate courts have required that the facts at issue
in the case at bar be compared to other cases to determine if a temporary detention
is justified. In State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2 181 (Utah 1987), the court found that
there was no articulable suspicion for immigration officers to stop a vehicle. The
justifications for the stop were that the occupants of the vehicle were hispanic, the
vehicle had California license plates, it was northbound on Interstate 15 and did not
change lanes when the agents' car approached at a high rate of speed. Similarly, in
State v. Carpina, supra, the court held that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
a vehicle with Arizona license plates that was driving slowly in a residential
neighborhood in the early morning hours.
In State v. Swaniaan, supra, the court held that there were no articulable facts
to justify the stop of two individuals near the scene of a residential burglary. An
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officer responding to a burglary report observed two individuals about one block from
the scene of the crime. After investigating the crime scene, the officer broadcast an
attempt to locate the two with a description of them. About two hours later, two
individuals matching the description from the broadcast were observed and detained
three blocks from the burglary. The court stated that those facts failed to indicate
that the defendants had been at the scene of the burglary or that they had engaged
in any criminal behavior. In State v. Trujillo. supra, a police officer observed three
individuals walking southbound on State Street in Salt Lake City at 3:00 a.m. One
of the individuals was carrying a knapsack.

When the officer approached, the

individuals appeared to be nervous and the knapsack was placed in a position as if to
conceal it. The court held that those observations did not constitute articulable facts
to show that a crime was being committed.
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), involved a stop of the
defendant at an airport. After deplaning, the defendant made a telephone call then
walked to the entrance to the airport where he was about to enter a taxi cab. At the
officer's request, the defendant allowed a search of his bag. He also raised his shirt
where the officers observed that the defendant had tape wrapped around his waist
which extended into his pants. During a pat down of the defendant's person the
officers felt a bulge under the tape. The trial court held that these facts failed to
establish a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. That ruling was upheld on
appeal.

In another airport search case, State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
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1988), officers relied on seven factors to justify the detention of the defendant.
Those factors were described by the court as follows:

(1) Sery arrived from Florida; (2) waited a few minutes at
the gate and looked nervously around there and before
entering the snack bar; (3) went to a telephone booth and
twice stood up and looked in the direction of the officers;
(4) took a strange route from the phone booth area back to
the concourse; (5) possessed a plane ticket on which he
claimed his name had been inaccurately recorded; (6) told
Pearson [the police officer] he had no identification on him;
and (7) left a telephone number with the airline
reservationist that had been changed to an unpublished
number.
Id at 942-943. The court found that all of this conduct was consistent with innocent
behavior and held that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendant to allow a dog to sniff his luggage for the contents of drugs.
In State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1991), the defendant drove his
pickup truck into a cul de sac where search warrants were being executed. When
officers approached, he appeared to be nervous. The court held that those facts
failed to establish a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in the
commission of a crime. Similarly, the court of appeals has ruled that entering a
residence that is the subject of police surveillance for drug trafficking, then leaving a
short time later did not constitute an articulable suspicion. State v. Sykes,

P.2d

,

198 U.A.R 17 (Utah App. 1992). The court found that such activity was consistent
with innocent behavior even though the officer testified that the defendant's actions
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were consistent with one making a drug purchase. In State v. Potter, supra, this
court held that a person who enters then leaves a house that was under surveillance
for drug activity could not be detained based on those facts alone. The information
relating to the drug activity indicated that it was ongoing before the defendant had
arrived.

There were no facts to tie the defendant to any criminal activity.

Furthermore, in State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), the court held that
the fact that a parolee was in a car in a parking lot wearing a winter coat failed to
establish a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in the commission of a crime.
The court indicated that a bulge in the coat indicative of a firearm or threatening or
evasive behavior by the defendant may have established a reasonable suspicion that
he was committing a crime. However, those facts were not present in that case.
In State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) this court held that the
failure of a driver to look at a highway patrolman without any indication that the
defendant was attempting to evade the officer or conceal contraband failed to
establish a reasonable suspicion. Finally, in State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App.
1988), the same sergeant Mangleson as was involved in the instant case, stopped a
car because " . . . something struck [him] funny about [the license plate sticker]." The
court held that information did not constitute an articulable suspicion necessary to
justify the stop of the automobile.
The facts in the instant case demonstrate that the truck driven by the
defendant was different from the same models released from the factory. There is no
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evidence to link the truck to places where drugs were used or distributed as in Sykes,
Potter and Steward. Nor could the truck be connected to a high crime location or area
where a crime had been committed as was the situation in Trujillo, Swanigan and
Carpina.

To allow officers to stop a vehicle for any purpose merely because it

appeared different from other vehicles of the same model is indistinguishable from
allowing officers to stop vehicles because the occupants were hispanic, as in
Mendoza. or was a parolee as in White. This case is closely analogous to Baird where
the stop was made because the license plate sticker looked unusual. Finally, the
alterations to the vehicle in this case are very similar to a person wearing tape which
covers a bulge on his person as was the situation in Carter. That factor did not
constitute a reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed. There
is nothing in the appearance of the truck inconsistent with innocent behavior. In
ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (R. 62-65). Other than the observations made by Mangleson that
were consistent with the existence of a hidden compartment, the trial court did not
enter any findings that would indicate appellant had contraband in the comipartment
at the time of the stop. Nor did those findings indicate that any other crime or traffic
offense was being committed prior to the stop.
Several cases from other jurisdictions have found that the location of a hidden
compartment is a factor that may be considered in determining if an officer has a
reasonable suspicion to justify a continued detention. However, these cases involved
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situations where the initial stop was made for reasons other than the existence of a
hidden compartment. Furthermore, additional facts were considered in conjunction
with the potential existence of a hidden compartment to establish a reasonable
suspicion. In United States v. Rubio-Rivera. 917 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1990), the
defendant had been stopped at an immigration checkpoint. Although the defendant
had a valid immigration card, he was detained at a second checkpoint. At the time
of the stop, the defendant appeared to be apprehensive and did not make eye contact
with the agents. The defendant had been on a trip for several days but there was an
inadequate amount of luggage for such a trip. The car had a Colorado license sticker,
but the defendant stated that it had been purchased in El Paso, Texas. Finally, the
agent observed a gasoline container inside of the car. That would be consistent with
the existence of a concealed compartment in the gas tank. The court found that
these facts were sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion to justify the continued
detention to investigate the compartment.
In United States v. Strickland, 920 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1990), the defendant
had been stopped for a traffic violation. He consented to the search of the vehicle.
The vehicle was a late model Mercedes sedan. An old tire was located in the trunk.
The rim on the tire was rusted and bent and did not match the other wheels on the
vehicle. The tire was a different make than the other tires on the car. It was also
worn differently than any of the other tires. The court found that those facts justified
a limited detention to conduct a further inspection of the tire.
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The facts in the instant case fail to establish a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in the commission of a crime. There was
nothing to link appellant to any illegal activity. The appellant took no evasive action
when the trooper followed him and drove next to him. The appellant did not make
any furtive gestures as if he was hiding or concealing contraband. The mere fact that
the design of the truck had been altered does not indicate that the occupant is
committing a crime. Likewise, the fact that a truck contains a secret compartment
does not raise an inference that the occupant is committing a crime. The detention
of the appellant violated his state and federal constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
POINT II
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
REQUIRES BOTH A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER
BEFORE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A CONSENT
TO SEARCH IS ADMISSIBLE.
After sergeant Mangleson detained the defendant, he request permission to
search the vehicle. The appellant gave verbal permission, then signed a consent to
search form. The appellant was not told that he could decline to give his consent.
The form did not indicate that the signor understood that he had the right to decline
to allow officers to search the vehicle. This court should rule that Article I Section 14
of the Utah Constitution requires both a knowing and voluntary waiver before a
consent to search is valid.
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This issue was raised in State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990).
However, in Bobo the court refused to address the issue because of inadequate
briefing. In a footnote, the court suggested a three part analysis be employed in
addressing novel state constitutional issues. First, the unique context of Utah's
constitutional development should be discussed. Second, it should be shown that the
state appellate courts give different interpretations to their respective constitutions
than is given to the federal constitution. Third, citation to authority from other states
supporting the particular construction that is urged should be provided.
The state should be required to demonstrate that a person is aware that he
need not submit to a search before it can claim that there was a valid consent to that
search.

The general purpose of such a requirement is to protect citizens from

overreaching by law enforcement agents who may use very subtle, yet coercive
means to obtain a consent to search. This requirement is also based on the concept
that there is a strong presumption against waiver of important constitutional rights.
State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.) ceu. dsn. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 2
The Utah appellate courts have given a different interpretation to the Utah
Constitution than has been given to the federal constitution on search and seizure
issues.

In State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court

recognized that the Utah Constitution prohibited the opening of a vehicle door to

2

Cases involving fourth amendment analysis are cited for illustrative purposes only
and are specifically not intended to mix state and federal constitutional analysis.
Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032, (1984).
14

inspect a vehicle identification number. That was a position rejected by the United
States Supreme Court in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). Likewise, in State
v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the state supreme court required a showing
of probable cause to seize bank records and provided additional privacy protections
in such records. In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected the Supreme Court's
ruling in United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Finally, in State v. Sims. 815
P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) cert, granted 853 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1993), this court
held that he state constitution requires specific statutory authorization to conduct a
roadblock.

This is a greater protection than has been provided under the

interpretations of the federal constitution.3
The history of the Utah Constitution has been discussed by one commentator.4
In that article, it was noted,

The majority of present state constitutions were drafted in
the later half of the 19th century, an era of popular mistrust
and hostility toward government. The people's mistrust of
government is readily apparent on the face of many state
constitutions. Utah's constitution, drafted in 1895, is
representative of the era, particularly in light of the fact
that most sections of the Utah constitution were copied

3

See: Michigan Department of State police v. Sitz.
(1990).
4

U.S.

,110 S.Ct.2481

Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government. The History of Utah's
Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 3 1 1 .
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from several other state constitutions drafted in the later
part of the period.6
The concept of barring the government from obtaining criminal convictions
based on the misconduct of its agents serves as a limitation on governmental power.
Giving the people broader protections under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution is consistent with the historical development of the Utah Constitution.
The majority of the justices in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218
(1973), held that there is no knowledge requirement for a waiver of fourth
amendment rights. The Court held that knowledge is only a factor to consider in
determining if there is a voluntary consent. However, the reasoning employed by the
Court to reach that conclusion is flawed. As a basis for the decision the Court first
relied on the line of cases dealing with voluntary confessions.6 Those cases did not
require that the person subjected to the questioning be aware that he had the right to
refuse to answer the questions. Employing that line of authority resulted in a test for
voluntariness that was based on the totality of the circumstances to determine if the
consent was voluntary or a product or a coercion of duress. The issue raised in those
cases related to whether the police behavior amounted to compulsion. It makes no

5

Flynn, supra, at 344.

6

Brown v. Mississippi, 229 U.S. 278 (1936); Havnes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503 (1963): Blackburn v. Alabama. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
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sense to require that a person be aware that he is free from compulsion. The reliance
on this line of cases in inappropriate to determine the issue of a consent to search.
The second reason given in Schneckloth for not requiring a knowing waiver
related to the problems the Court felt would be inherent in proving knowledge.
However, if the police simply were to give a suspect a warning that he need not
consent to a search, that should suffice to prove knowledge. The Court claimed that
the giving of such warnings would be impractical. First, it would be impractical to
formulate the warnings. Second, it would interrupt the flow of events and hinder
police investigations. The first reason is simply wrong. Such warnings could be very
specific and simple.7 As for the second reason, that is really an argument that favors
requiring a warning. People should not be required to unknowingly waive fundamental
constitutional rights under the pressures inherent in a police encounter.
There are other problems with the argument that a warning would hinder police
investigation. When a citizen's constitutional rights are weighed against the need to
investigate a crime, the constitutional rights are obviously more important. In his
dissenting opinion in Schneckloth. Justice Marshall addressed the issue of the
practical need for police investigation. He stated,

I must conclude with some reluctance that when the Court
speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the
7

An appropriate statement by the officer may be: "You have the right to refuse
to allow me to conduct a search. That refusal cannot be used by law enforcement
officers as a reason to search or to obtain a search warrant."
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continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance
of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they
could not achieve by relying only on the knowing
relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would
be "practical" for the police to ignore the commands of the
Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean that more
criminals will be apprehended, even though the
constitutional rights of innocent people also go by the
board. But such a practical advantage is achieved only at
the cost of permitting the police to disregard the limitations
that the Constitution places on their behavior, a cost that
a constitutional democracy cannot long absorb.
412 U.S. at 288, Marshall J., dissenting.
The majority of the Court in Schneckloth also noted that a requirement for
knowledge of a right before a waiver is unnecessary when that right is not involved
in the guarantee of a fair trial. As a result of this reasoning, the majority held that
there is no requirement that courts indulge every presumption against a waiver of
fourth amendment rights. However, that very requirement has been imposed to
determine if there has been a waiver of fourth amendment rights, State v. Marshall.
supra. Furthermore, by concluding that knowing waivers apply only to trial rights, the
Court simply disregards the holding in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
that case, the Court required officers to inform a suspect of his privilege against selfincrimination and right to counsel before conducting a custodial interrogation. Giving
a statement to authorities is not a trial right such as the right to confrontation or the
right to counsel. Consequently, the Court's reliance on this line of reasoning is
inappropriate.
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Finally, the Court in Schneckloth distinguishes the Miranda requirements
because the situation in Schneckloth did not involve inherently coercive tactics. The
Court further reasoned that the situation where a consent to search is obtained does
not generally involve a defendant being in custody. Furthermore, a consent to search
is often sought after a questionable or illegal detention or prior illegal search8 as was
the situation in this case.

Oftentimes, a consent to search is given under

circumstances that are equally or more coercive than the custodial interrogation which
the Miranda court sought to control.
The reasoning supporting the conclusion in Schneckloth is obviously flawed.
The dissenters all would have held that a fundamental constitutional right cannot be
waived without one being aware of its existence. Justice Marshall summarized the
need for this knowledge requirement and criticized the majority opinion stating,
The holding today confines the protection of the
Fourth Amendment against searches conducted without
probable cause to the sophisticated, the knowledgeable,
and I might add, the few. [footnote omitted] In the final
analysis, the Court now sanctions a game of blindman's
bluff, in which the police always have the upper hand, for
the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the
police. But the guarantees of the Fourth amendment were
never intended to shrink before such an ephemeral and
changeable interest. The f ramers of the Fourth Amendment
struck the balance against this sort of convenience and in
favor of certain basic civil rights.

8

See: State v. Sierra, supra; State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990); State
v. Sim$, supra; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990); State v. GodinaLuna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).
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412 U.S. at 289-290, Marshall J., dissenting.
A number of cases from other jurisdictions have also addressed this issue. The
majority of those cases do not require knowledge of the right to consent. However,
those cases fail to address the policies underlying the decision in Schneckloth. See:
State v. Christofferson. 101 Ida. 156, 610 P.2d 515 (1980); Kino v. State. 557
S.W.2d 386 (Ark.1977); State v. Rodoers. 349 N.W.2d 453 (Wis. 1984); Frink v.
State. 597 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1979); State v. Stemole. 646 P.2d 539 (Mont. 1982).
In State v. Osborn. 402 A.2d 493 (N.H. 1979), the court held that knowledge
of the right to refuse is not a necessary component of a valid consent to search. In
reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that proof of knowledge is not necessary
as most people understand that the only practical consequence of a refusal to consent
is to force the state to obtain a warrant authorizing the search. The flaw in this
reasoning is demonstrated by the number of cases where a consent has been obtained
after an illegal

The information obtained from the primary illegality cannot be

used to establi

able cause to obtain a warrant.

Silverthorn Lumber v. United

States. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Consequently, a refusal to consent would not result
in officer obtaining a valid warrant leading to admissible evidence.
Another case that rejects this knowledge requirement is State v. Flores. 280
Or. 273, 570 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977), that case lists four considerations in determining

9

See: State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991); State
v. Carter, supra; State v. Godina-Luna. supra.
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the need to give a different analysis to the state constitution than is given to the
federal constitution. In addition to an analysis of textual and historical differences,
the Oregon court in Flores also looked to the need to resolve unique local problems
and the need for uniform standards for law enforcement. In Flores. the court found
no widespread misconduct resulting in an infringement of suspect's rights. However
in Utah, the cases previously cited indicate that law enforcement officers try to vitiate
prior illegalities by obtaining a consent to search.10 Consequently, there is a unique
local problem to be addressed under a state constitutional analysis.
The policies favoring the need for a knowing consent include the importance
of the waiver of a constitutional right and the inherently coercive nature of a police
request to search. These policies were adopted in the cases from those jurisdictions
that require proof of knowledge that person need not consent to a search before the
evidence seized pursuant to such a search is admissible. In Lonastreet v. State. 592
So.2d 16 (Miss. 1991), and Perrick v. State. 440 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1983), the court
relied on the same standard to establish consent to search as is required to prove
waiver of any other constitutional right.

That standard requires proof of both

knowledge of the right and voluntary waiver of that right. In State v. Johnson. 68
N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the court relied on reasoning similar to that asserted
by Justice Marshall in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. supra. In Johnson, the court noted
that most persons view a request to search by a police officer as having the force of

10

See: footnote 8, supra.
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the law.

The court went on to note that one's assent to such a request is not

meaningful unless the person involved knew he had the right accede to it.
There is no question that it is a minority position in the courts to require both
voluntariness and knowledge of the right to refuse to consent to a search before
evidence seized pursuant to such a search is admissible. However, the policy reasons
supporting such a position are much more compelling than the policies supporting the
federal standard. This court should impose such a knowledge requirement for a
consent to search under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. In doing so
this court should conclude that any consent given in this case does not justify the
search resulting in the discovery of the marijuana.
POINT III
ANY CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE LACKED
ATTENUATION FROM THE INITIAL ILLEGAL STOP,
MAKING THE EVIDENCE SEIZED INADMISSABLE.

For evidence to be admissible as a result of a consent to search, that consent
must be voluntary and it must be attenuated from any prior illegal search or seizure.
State v. Arrovo. supra, State v. Thurman, supra. If the court finds that the consent
is involuntary, this attenuation analysis need not be reached. However, if the consent
is found to be voluntary, then the court must determine if that consent was
attenuated from the illegal detention.
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To determine if a voluntary consent is sufficiently attenuated from a prior illegal
stop or search, an analysis of three factors is required. Those factors were initially
described in Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

The factors include: the

temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent, the presence
or absence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal
police conduct. In a number of cases this court has analyzed these factors and found
as a matter of law that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the initial
illegal detention.11 All of those cases involve situations where the consent was
given during an unlawful detention.
The only case where this court held that the consent was not tainted by the
prior illegal stop is State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992). In that case,
the officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation.

The driver's license,

registration and traffic ticket were returned. The officer allowed the defendant to
leave. The defendant did not do so, but stayed and asked the officer questions. As
a result of that questioning, a consent to search the vehicle was obtained. The
instant case is clearly distinguishable from Castner. The defendant in this case was
never free to leave after the initial stop and during the illegal detention. Sergeant
Mangleson requested the consent to search immediately after stopping the vehicle

11

State v. Sims, supra; State v. Park, supra; State v. Carter, supra; State v.
Robinson, supra; State v. Godina-Luna. supra; State v. Small. 829 P.2d 129 (Utah
App.) ££££• denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
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and obtaining the driver's license and registration. Mangleson indicated the purpose
for the stop was to search the vehicle and he was prepared to do so without the
driver's consent.
In State v. Thurman. supra, the Supreme Court of Utah found that a consent
was sufficiently attenuated from any fourth amendment violation to allow the
evidence to be admissible. In Thurman officers conducting a homicide investigation
executed a warrant on the defendant's home. Several hours later, at a location away
from the residence that was searched, the defendant consented to the search of a
storage unit. He signed the written consent form. Due to the separation of time and
location, the court found sufficient attenuation to make the evidence seized pursuant
to the voluntary consent admissible. The time and location circumstances distinguish
the instant case from Thurman. Furthermore, Thurman did not involve issue of an
unlawful detention as is in involved in this case. Nor was the consent in Thurman
given during such a detention.
The second factor from Arroyo involves an analysis of

intervening

circumstances. The instant case is again analogous to Robinson. Sims and Park
where no such circumstances were found. Courts in other jurisdictions have found
intervening circumstances to include a release from custody and appearance before
the magistrate, discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated charge,
United States v. Delaadillo-VelasQuez. 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1988).

Other

intervening circumstances that may establish sufficient attenuation include: giving of
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the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult with a passenger, United
States v. Berrv, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983); Juarez v. State. 708 S.W.2d 772
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988); telling the defendant that he did not have to consent to the
search, Reves v. State. 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); developing probable
cause from independent sources to justify the detention, Untied States v. Cherry. 794
F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); and whether the consent was volunteered or requested,
People v. Boroes. 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 511 N.E.2d 58 (1987). None of these
circumstances or other analogous circumstances were present in this case.
Consequently, this factor also weighs against the state.
The final factor to be analyzed is the purpose and flagrancy of the detention.
The more flagrant the violation, Thurman requires additional intervening circumstances
and the passage of more time before the evidence may be admissible. In Sims the
court indicated that if the purposes of the roadblock were good then the unlawful
detention may be overlooked.12

The court in Sims found that a roadblock for

multiple purposes did not outweigh the other factors in this attenuation analysis.
Likewise, the purpose of the stop in the instant case could not outweigh the effect
of the first two factors. Mangleson testified that he intended to search, seize and
forfeit the vehicle even if consent was not obtained to do so or even if contraband
was not located. Those actions and intentions indicate a particularly flagrant violation.

12

A more logical reading of this factor is that if the initial illegality was for a
particularly bad purpose or was a flagrant violation, then the evidence may be ordered
to be suppressed in spite of favorable analysis for the State on the other two factors.
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If this court finds that the consent in this case was voluntary, that voluntariness
is tainted by the prior illegal detention. The detention and any consent were closely
related in time and there were no intervening circumstances. In fact, the consent was
given during the unlawful detention. The sole purpose of the detention was to search
the vehicle.

Consequently, the evidence seized as a

result of the search is

inadmissible.
CONCLUSION
The stop and search of the vehicle that the defendant was driving violated both
the fourth amendment and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The

evidence seized as a result of that stop and search is inadmissible. The judgement
and conviction entered below should be reversed and the case remanded to the
district court with an order requiring that the evidence be suppressed.
Dated this

day of February, 1994.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 920133
JAMES JOHN CONTREL,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
October 22, 1992 upon the Defendant's Motion to Suppress before the
Honorable

Ray

M.

Harding.

The

defendant

was

present

and

represented by his attorneys, Stephen R. McCaughey and Barry
Witlin.

The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr.,

Juab County Attorney.
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the
plaintiff and defendant, reviewed the Memorandums of Law and
arguments of counsel, and having submitted its Memorandum Decision.
The Court being fully advised in the premises makes the
1

following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 4, 1992 Sergeant Paul Mangelson, a 25 year

veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol was patrolling 1-15 within Juab
County together with Trooper Lance Bushnell.
2.

Both Sergeant Mangelson and Trooper Bushnell have had

extensive

training

and

experience

in the

enforcement and drug identification.

area

of

drug

law

Sergeant Mangelson has been

involved in many cases involving compartments within motor vehicles
used to conceal controlled substances.
3. While patrolling, Sergeant Mangelson observed a northbound
pickup truck, and made the following observations prior to stopping
the vehicle:
a.

The vehicle was a 1990 Chevrolet pickup.

b.

The edge of the rear bumper had been bent so as to
conceal the area behind it.

c.

The gas tank was much lower than that of a stock model
truck.

d.

The vehicle had been recently undercoated (observable in
the rear tire area).

e. Unlike stock model vehicles, the vehicle had no air space
between the truck bed and the frame.
f•

The vehicle also had bright yellow, oversized shock
2

absorbers, a bed liner, and a tool box in the bed area.
4.

Sergeant Mangelson noted that the vehicle was identical

in every respect (except for its color) to a vehicle he had seized
several months earlier containing a secret compartment behind the
bumper in which Mangelson had discovered

large quantities of

contraband.
5. Based upon Sergeant Mangelsonfs observations and his past
experience, the officers stopped the vehicle, with the intent to
search the vehicle for a hidden compartment.
6.
Contrel.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, James John
The driver produced a Florida driver's license and a

Pennsylvania registration.

The driver said the vehicle belonged

to his friend Carmen, but he did not know Carmen's address or
telephone number.
7.

The officer asked the defendant if he was transporting

drugs or if there were any firearms or contraband in the vehicle.
The defendant replied "No". The officer then asked for consent to
search the vehicle.

The defendant gave consent to search the

vehicle, both orally and in writing.
8.

The officers then went to the rear of the vehicle and

accessed the secret compartment, exactly as Sergeant Mangelson did
in the previous case, and after they removed the cover plate, found
in excess of 100 lbs. of marijuana in the hidden compartment. The
defendant was thereafter arrested.

3

Pursuant to the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The stop of the subject vehicle was a constitutionally

valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion that the subject vehicle
had a hidden compartment containing contraband.
2.

The detainment of the defendant after the stop was

reasonable to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
3.

The defendant's consent to search the vehicle and waiver

of his constitutional rights was voluntary.
4.

Although a knowing waiver of his constitutional rights

under the U.S. and Utah Constitution is not necessary when giving
a consent to search, the defendant in this case did make a knowing
waiver when he gave his written consent.
5.

The defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied.

Clerk of Dismct Court, Juab Couruy

F I L E O

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.
Criminal No. 920133
JAMES JOHN CONTREL,
Defendant.

Based

upon

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

previously entered by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
Dated this

^

day of

£S£Ht£^

, 1993.

^Deontv

